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Shapiro: Palimony and the
Estate Tax
By Wendy C. Gerzog
For over two decades, Ms. Chenchark and Mr.
Shapiro lived together. She took care of the house-
hold and he paid her living expenses, including a
weekly allowance. When he cheated on her, the
relationship ended with Chenchark suing Shapiro
for palimony.1 The following year, Shapiro died.
The executor of Shapiro’s estate filed an estate tax
return in May 2001. In September 2001 a jury found
there was no express or implied contract between
the parties. Chenchark appealed, and the estate
settled that claim plus Chenchark’s will-contest
lawsuit for a total of approximately $1 million.2 In
2003 the estate filed an amended return, valuing the
palimony claim at $8 million at decedent’s date of
death. In 2006 the estate filed a claim in federal
district court, valuing that claim at $5 million. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted the government summary judgment,
finding there was insufficient consideration to sup-
port a contract claim that was deductible under
section 2053.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that the lower
court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that
‘‘love, support, and homemaking services’’ are in-
sufficient consideration to support a state contract
claim. Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Barry
G. Silverman elaborated on the contract law
changes beginning with Marvin v. Marvin3 that
expanded the rights of cohabitants and what the
circuit court viewed as the lower court’s misreading
of Western States Construction Inc. v. Michoff.4 Ac-
cording to the appeals court, Western States did not
conclude that love, support, and homemaking ser-
vices ‘‘cannot, as a matter of law, constitute consid-
eration for a promise to share property under
Nevada law.’’5 While acknowledging that Nevada
courts had not addressed the issue, the circuit court
proceeded to discuss California law on the subject,
which is that ‘‘a promise to perform homemaking
services is adequate to support such a contract,’’
and Arizona law, which held that such a promise
may constitute consideration.6
The Ninth Circuit stated that the lower court
never addressed the adequacy of consideration and
that its ‘‘point is simply that these services are not of
zero value as a matter of law.’’7 The court held that
summary judgment was improper. Finding that the
value of Chenchark’s claim at the decedent’s death
is an issue of fact,8 the court remanded the case on
that issue.
The district court also had held that the estate
was estopped from claiming that an employment
contract existed between the decedent and Chen-
chark because the estate defended against her claim
on the basis of the nonexistence of an employment
contract. The circuit court, however, again held for
the estate on the basis that the estate’s positions
were not inconsistent with its position in the instant
case, which was to claim a deduction for the value
of Chenchark’s claim against the estate.9
Senior Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima dis-
sented on one issue — the court’s decision about the
estate’s deduction under section 2053. He disagreed
with the majority about the value of Chenchark’s
1Estate of Shapiro v. United States, No. 08-17491 at 2725 (9th
Cir. Feb. 22, 2011), Doc 2011-3741, 2011 TNT 36-12 (all pinpoint
citations are to page numbers in the PDF of the Ninth Circuit
opinion in the Tax Notes Today database). Chenchark sued on
‘‘breach of express and implied contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and quantum meruit.’’ Id.
2Id. at 2726.
3557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
4840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992).
5No. 08-17491 at 2729 (emphasis added).
6Id. at 2729-2730 (emphasis added).
7Id. at 2730.
8Id. at 2731.
9On the grounds that the estate earlier abandoned its claim,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against the estate relating to the property value
reductions based on the notices of lis pendens filed by Chenchark
on a specific property. Id. at 2732.
Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of
Baltimore School of Law.
In Estate of Shapiro, the Ninth Circuit held that an
individual had a valid palimony claim under Nevada
state law. However, the issue was whether the dece-
dent’s estate qualified for a deduction for that claim
under federal estate tax law.
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claim for federal estate tax purposes.10 Although the
majority was concerned about a possible misread-
ing of Nevada law on contracts between cohab-
itants, the case is not dependent on state contract
law interpretation, but on federal tax law: whether
‘‘the claim underlying [the estate’s] deduction [is]
supported by full consideration in money’s
worth.’’11
As Judge Tashima explained, although ‘‘a valid
state law claim is a necessary condition for the
deduction, [it is] not necessarily a sufficient one.’’12
That someone has an enforceable claim against the
estate under state law is not enough to constitute a
claim deductible under the federal tax statute. He
cited the circuit’s own precedent explaining that
legal consideration for state law purposes ‘‘is im-
material’’ for federal estate tax law purposes.13
The purpose of the estate tax rule is to prevent
the depletion of the decedent’s estate by easily
recharacterizing what should be bequests into al-
lowable deductions.14 As a co-executor expressed in
his letter to Shapiro, despite there being no legiti-
mate claim, ‘‘it would be a nice gesture . . . to make
some arrangement to put money in an account or
trust [for Chenchark] to pay for support during her
lifetime.’’15 Judge Tashima noted that code refer-
ences to ‘‘money or money’s worth’’ consideration
routinely exclude ‘‘love and affection.’’16 Essen-
tially, ‘‘the Estate has presented no evidence here
that would create a genuine issue of material fact
that Chenchark enhanced the value of the Estate in
money’s worth.’’17 Indeed, the estate acknowledged
that she ‘‘gave nothing of monetary value to the
relationship.’’18
Wemyss
Commissioner v. Wemyss19 is a classic gift tax case
in which the taxpayer wanted to marry a widow
who was reluctant to marry him because she would
lose income from her deceased husband’s trusts
upon her remarriage. So he transferred stock to her
to offset that financial loss, and they married.20 The
issue was whether marriage or a financial detriment
to the widow, which constituted adequate consid-
eration to support a contract under state law, rep-
resented ‘‘full and adequate consideration in
money’s worth’’ for gift tax purposes. Justice Felix
Frankfurter, writing for the Supreme Court, agreed
with the Tax Court: ‘‘And so, while recognizing that
marriage was of course a valuable consideration to
support a contract, the Tax Court did not deem
marriage to satisfy the requirement of [the statute]
in that it was not a consideration reducible to
money value.’’21
Likewise, agreeing with the Tax Court and em-
phasizing that ‘‘common law considerations were
not embodied in the gift tax,’’22 the Supreme Court
stated that ‘‘if Mrs. More’s loss of her trust income
rather than the marriage was consideration for the
taxpayer’s transfer of his stock to her, [the taxpayer]
is not relieved from the tax because he did not
receive any money’s worth from Mrs. More’s relin-
quishment of her trust income.’’23
The Court approved the lower court’s finding
that the stock transfer was not ‘‘at arm’s length in
the ordinary course of business.’’ It noted that the
inducement was marriage, took account of the
discrepancy between what the widow got and what
she gave up, and also of the benefit that her
marriage settlement brought to her son.’’ Examin-
ing the legislative intent of the gift tax, the Court
held that the reason the gift tax applies to any
transfer not for ‘‘adequate and full (money) consid-
eration’’ is to tax transfers that would otherwise
have been part of the donor’s estate. ‘‘To allow
detriment to the donee to satisfy the requirement of
‘adequate and full consideration’ would violate the
purpose of the statute and open wide the door for
evasion of the gift tax.’’24
Merrill v. Fahs
In this companion case to Wemyss, with an opin-
ion also written by Justice Frankfurter, the taxpayer
agreed to transfer a considerable sum of money
after his marriage and to provide additional sums
to his wife and their children in his will.25 In
consideration of those transfers, his fiancée agreed
to release her marital property rights. ‘‘The induce-
ments for this agreement were stated to be the
contemplated marriage, desire to make fair requital
for the release of marital rights, freedom for the
10Judge Tashima concurred in the lis pendens and adminis-
trative expense issues. Because of his dissent on the section 2053
issue, he found it unnecessary to decide the estate’s judicial
estoppel claim. Id. at 2733.
11Id. at 2734.
12Id.
13Id. at 2735, citing Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285, 287
(9th Cir. 1945).
14Id. at 2736.








23Id. at 305. ‘‘If we are to isolate as an independently
reviewable question of law the view of the Tax Court that
money consideration must benefit the donor to relieve a transfer
by him from being a gift, we think the Tax Court was correct.’’
Id. at 307.
24Id. at 307-308.
25324 U.S. 308 (1945).
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taxpayer to make appropriate provisions for his
children and other dependents, the uncertainty
surrounding his financial future and marital tran-
quility.’’26 The agreement was enforceable under
state law, and under state law, wives had inchoate
marital property rights. The couple married and
carried out the terms of the agreement.
The issue in Merrill was whether there was a
taxable gift for a transfer for full and adequate
consideration in money or money’s worth.27 To
answer that question, the Court looked to Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner,28 which explained the root
of the phrase in the context of the estate tax deduc-
tion for claims against an estate:
The gift tax was supplementary to the estate
tax. The two are in pari materia and must be
construed together. The phrase on the mean-
ing of which decision must largely turn — that
is, transfers for other than ‘‘an adequate and
full consideration in money or money’s
worth’’ — came into the gift tax by way of
estate tax provisions. It first appeared in the
Revenue Act of 1926. Section 303(a)(1) of that
Act allowed deductions from the value of the
gross estate of claims against the estate to the
extent that they were bona fide and incurred
‘‘for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth.’’ It is important to
note that the language of previous Acts which
made the test ‘‘fair consideration’’ was thus
changed after courts had given ‘‘fair consid-
eration’’ an expansive construction. The first
modern estate tax law had included in the
gross estate transfers in contemplation of, or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at, death, except ‘‘a bona fide sale for a
fair consideration in money or money’s
worth.’’ Dower rights and other marital prop-
erty rights were intended to be included in the
gross estate since they were considered merely
an expectation, and in 1918 Congress specifi-
cally included them. This provision was for the
purpose of clarifying the existing law. In 1924
Congress limited deductible claims against an
estate to those supported by ‘‘a fair consid-
eration in money or money’s worth’’ . . . Con-
gress was thus led as we have indicated to
substitute in the 1926 Revenue Act the words
‘‘adequate and full consideration’’ in order to
narrow the scope of tax exemptions.29
To prevent tax avoidance, the Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision against the taxpayer.
Analysis and Conclusion
Although the Ninth Circuit sporadically men-
tioned the legal precepts that control whether an
expense is deductible as a claim against the estate
under section 2053, the court focused on what
constitutes consideration under state law. Unfortu-
nately, that is not the applicable law or precedent to
decide Shapiro.
While spending a lot of time discussing consid-
eration for state law contract purposes, the court,
for federal transfer tax purposes, peculiarly differ-
entiated state law contract consideration from con-
sideration in money or money’s worth. Although
the claim must be allowable under local law, that
was not central to the controversy and, indeed, was
not the basis for the government’s denial of the
deduction here. Rather, the focus is on whether
there is adequate consideration in money or
money’s worth to support the deduction under
section 2053. The majority not only lost sight of the
pertinent issue in the case but also never seemed to
understand that it was the pivotal source of the
controversy.
Judge Tashima’s excellent dissent had it right in
every respect. It properly analyzes the applicable
estate tax principles and arrives at the correct




28308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
29324 U.S. at 311-312 (citations omitted).
30What also troubles me is that this is not the only case in
which the Ninth Circuit has confused the application of state
law in a federal transfer tax case. Its reversal in Linton v. United
States, 630 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-1458, 2011 TNT
15-27, is likewise problematic. See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Linton
Reversed: Indirect Gifts and the Step Transaction Doctrine,’’ Tax
Notes, Mar. 28, 2011, p. 1607, Doc 2011-4779, or 2011 TNT 62-8.
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